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Abstract: Cloud computing is rapidly emerging due to the provisioning of elastic, flexible, and on-demand 
storage and computing services for customers . Organizations with a low budget can now utilize high 
computing and storage services without heavily investing in infrastructure and maintenance. However, 
the loss of control over data and computation raises many security concerns for organizations, thwarting 
the wide adaptability of the public cloud. The loss of control over data and the storage platform also 
motivates cloud customers to maintain the access control over data (individual data and the data shared 
among a group of users through the public cloud) .Moreover, the privacy and confidentiality of the data 
is also recommended to be cared for by the customers .The confidentiality management by a customer 
ensures that the cloud does not learn any information about the customer data. Cryptography is used as a 
typical tool to provide confidentiality and privacy services to the data. The data are usually encrypted 
before storing to the cloud. The access control, key management, encryption, and decryption processes 
are handled by the customers to ensure data security. However, when the data are to be shared among a 
group, the cryptographic services need to be flexible enough to handle different users, exercise the access 
control, and manage the keys in an effective manner to safeguard data confidentiality .The data handling 
among a group has certain additional characteristics as opposed to two-party communication or the data 
handling belonging to a single user. The existing, departing, and newly joining group members can prove 
to be an insider threat violating data confidentiality and privacy. Insider threats can prove to be more 
devastating due to the fact that they are generally launched by trusted entities. Due to the fact that people 
trust insider entities, the research community focuses more on outsider attackers. Nevertheless, multiple 
security issues can arise due to different users in a group. A literature study is made in this paper. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The SeDaSC methodology is proposed to provide 
the following services to the outsourced data:- 
Confidentiality; Secure data sharing among the 
group; Secure data from unauthorized access of 
valid insiders within the group; and Forward and 
backward access control to counter insiders and 
departing group users. In the case of SeDaSC, the 
file is encrypted with K. K is generated at the CS 
and is deleted right after utilization. The CS or the 
user cannot reconstruct K alone. For 
confidentiality, the data cannot be leaked unless the 
attacker gains access to K. K in its entirety is not 
stored anywhere, and neither does it travel on the 
communication channel. Therefore, the access to K 
is a difficult task. Although an attacker gets hold of 
the user share, i.e., Ki’, he/she will have to guess 
the other share correctly. The guess or random 
generation is to be made from a total of 2^256 − 1 
possible shares. The probability of generating the 
correct share is (1/ (2256 − 1)) = 8.636 × 10^−78, 
which is negligible. Moreover, if the insider within 
the cloud gets access to the file, the absence of K 
will be a barrier to subvert the confidentiality of the 
data. For secure data sharing, SeDaSC does not 
utilize the concept of reencryption with multiple 
keys. The encryption is done with a single 
symmetric key. However, the authorized users are 
granted access on the basis of possession of the key 
share and the typical authentication and 
authorization phenomenon. The ACL lists the 
authorized users with their credentials and 
corresponding CS key shares. After authentication, 
the user share of the key is used, along with the CS 
share, to generate K. As the user share is only 
possessed by a valid user, only a valid user can lead 
to successful encryption/decryption of the data. The 
division and dispersal of the key also helps counter 
the insider malicious users within the group. The 
ACL is separately maintained for each group file. 
Therefore, a valid group user cannot access the 
group file that is not shared with him/her. An 
attempt to access an unauthorized file is also 
blocked by the fact that the user will not have the 
key share for that file. Moreover, the ACL of the 
unauthorized file will not contain any record for the 
malicious user. Furthermore, the absence of the 
entire key with the user and the ACL collectively 
ensures the forward and backward access control 
for the data.Most of the data forwarding schemes 
are dependent on the El-Gamal cryptosystem and 
bilinear pairing. The aforesaid schemes require the 
reencryption of the data each time the access to the 
data is requested by any user other than the owner. 
The El-Gamal cryptosystem is computationally 
intensive. Moreover, reencryption at each access 
adds to the overhead. The SeDaSC methodology 
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utilizes symmetric encryption, and the access to 
multiple users is achieved through key 
management, as explained in the preceding section. 
Therefore, the overhead of the SeDaSC 
methodology is fairly less as compared with the 
traditional El-Gamal-based reencryption systems. 
II. RESEARCH WORK FROM 
LITERATURE 
Xu et al. [8] proposed a certificateless proxy 
reencryption (CL-PRE) scheme for securely 
sharing the data within a group in the public cloud. 
In the CL-PRE scheme, the data owner encrypts the 
data with the symmetric key. Subsequently, the 
symmetric key is encrypted with the public key of 
the data owner. Both the encrypted data and the 
key are uploaded to the cloud. The encrypted key is 
reencrypted by the cloud that becomes decryptable 
by the user’s private key. The public–private keys 
generated in the proposed scheme are not based on 
the certificates. The user’s identity is used to 
generate the public– private key pair. The proxy 
reencryption is based on bilinear pairing and the 
BDH that makes the CL-PRE scheme 
computationally intensive. The computational cost 
of the bilinear pairing is high as compared with the 
standard operations in finite fields. Seo et al. [6] 
introduced a mediated certificateless encryption 
approach for data sharing in the public cloud that 
avoids bilinear pairing. In the proposed scheme, the 
cloud generates the public–private key pairs for all 
of the users and transmits the public keys to all of 
the participating users. Partial decryption is 
performed at the cloud. Due to the fact that key 
management and partial decryption are handled by 
the cloud, user revocation is easier to handle. 
However, the proposed scheme treats the public 
cloud both as a trusted and untrusted entity at the 
same time. From a security perspective, it is not 
recommended to shift the key generation process to 
the shared multitenant public cloud environment. 
Moreover, the decryption is performed twice in the 
system that reduces the advantage of not pairing to 
some extent. Khan et al. [2] also utilized the El-
Gamal cryptosystem and bilinear pairing for the 
sharing of sensitive information in the cloud. The 
proposed scheme uses a trusted third party as a 
proxy that performs the compute-intensive 
operations of key generation, reencryption, and 
managing access to the data. However, the 
computational complexities of bilinear pairing still 
exist in the system. Chen and Tzeng [9] proposed a 
methodology based on the shared key derivation 
method for securing data sharing among a group. 
The methodology uses a binary tree for the 
computation of keys. However, the computational 
cost of the proposed scheme is high as the rekeying 
mechanism is heavily employed in the proposed 
scheme. Moreover, the scheme is not tailored for 
public cloud systems because certain operations 
require centralized mediations. A similar Rivest–
Shamir–Adleman (RSA)-based approach was also 
proposed in. However, the scheme was vulnerable 
against collusion attacks. 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The SeDaSC methodology works with three 
entities as follows: -Users; A cryptographic server 
(CS); and The cloud.  The data owner submits the 
data, the list of the users, and the parameters 
required for generating an access control list (ACL) 
to the CS. The CS is a trusted third party and is 
responsible for key management, encryption, 
decryption, and access control. The CS generates 
the symmetric key and encrypts the data with the 
generated key. Subsequently, for each user in the 
group, the CS divides the key into two parts such 
that a single part alone cannot regenerate the key. 
Successively, the original key is deleted through 
secure overwriting. One part of the key is 
transmitted to the corresponding user in the group, 
whereas the other part is maintained by the CS 
within the ACL related to the data file. The ACL is 
generated through the parameter submitted by the 
data owner. The encrypted data are subsequently 
uploaded to the cloud for storage on behalf of the 
user. The user who wishes to access the data sends 
a download request to the CS. The CS, after 
authenticating the requesting user, receives the 
portion of the key from the user and subsequently 
downloads the data file from the cloud. The key is 
regenerated by operating on the user portion of the 
key, and the corresponding CS maintained portion 
for that particular user. The data are decrypted and 
sent back to the user. For a newly joining member, 
the two portions of the key are generated, and the 
user is added to the ACL. For a departing member, 
the record is deleted from the ACL. The departing 
member cannot decrypt the data on its own as 
he/she only possesses a portion of the key. 
Similarly, no frequent decryption and reencryption 
are needed in case of changes in the group 
membership. Moreover, SeDaSC can be used with 
the mobile cloud computing paradigm in addition 
to conventional cloud computing due to the fact 
that compute-intensive operations are performed by 
the CS. 
IV. CHALLENGES 
A single key shared between all groups members 
will result in the access of past data to a newly 
joining member. The aforesaid situation violates 
the confidentiality and the principle of least 
privilege. Likewise, a departing member can access 
future communication. Therefore, in group-shared 
data, the inside members might generate the issue 
of backward access control (a new user accessing 
past data) and forward access control (a departing 
user accessing future data). The simple solution of 
rekeying (generating a new key, decrypting all the 
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data, and reencrypting with the new key) does not 
prove to be scalable for frequent changes in the 
group membership. A separate key for every user is 
a cumbersome solution. The data must be 
separately encrypted for every user in such a 
scenario. The changes in the data require 
decryption of all of the copies of the users and 
encryption again with the modified contents. The 
existing and legitimate group members might show 
illegitimate behaviour to manipulate the data .The 
presence of the entire symmetric key with a user 
allows a malicious user to turn into an insider threat 
.The data can be decrypted, modified, and 
reencrypted by a malicious insider within a group. 
Consequently, a legitimate user in the group may 
access certain unauthorized files within the group. 
On the other hand, it is necessary for a user to 
possess a key to conduct various operations on the 
data. The possession of the key also implicitly 
proves the legitimacy of a user to operate on the 
data. Nevertheless, simultaneously dealing with 
both the issues related to the key is an important 
issue that needs to be addressed effectively. 
SeDaSC Entities 
The SeDaSC methodology has the following 
entities:- 
Cloud: The cloud provides storage services to the 
user. The data on the cloud need to be secured 
against privacy breaches. The confidentiality of the 
data is ensured by storing encrypted data over the 
cloud. The cloud in the SeDaSC methodology only 
involves basic cloud operations of file upload and 
download. Therefore, no changes at the protocol or 
implementation level on the cloud are required. 
CS: The CS is a trusted party and is responsible for 
security operations, such as key management, 
encryption, decryption, the management of the 
ACL for providing confidentiality, and secure data 
forwarding among the group. The users of SeDaSC 
are required to be registered with the CS to obtain 
the security services. The CS is assumed to be a 
secure entity in the proposed methodology. The CS 
can be maintained by an organization or can be 
owned by a third-party provider. However, the CS 
maintained by an organization will generate more 
trust in the system. 
Users: The users are the clients of the storage 
cloud. For each data file, one user will be the 
owner of the file, whereas the others in the group 
will be the data consumers. The owner of the file 
decides the access rights of the other group 
members. The access rights are granted and 
revoked based on the decision of the owner. The 
access rights are managed by the CS in the form of 
an ACL file. A separate ACL is maintained for 
each of the data files. 
 
V. CONCLUSION ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC 
KEYS 
The SeDaSC methodology maintains a single 
cryptographic key for each of the data files. 
However, after encryption/decryption, the whole 
key is not stored and possessed by any of the 
involved parties. The key is partitioned into two 
constituent parts and are possessed by different 
entities. The following are the keys that are used 
within SeDaSC:- 
Symmetric Key K: K is a random secret generated 
by the CS for each of the data files. The length of K 
in SeDaSC is 256 bits, as is recommended by most 
of the standards regarding key length for symmetric 
key algorithms (SKAs). However, the length of the 
key can be altered according to the requirements of 
the underlying SKA. K is obtained in a two-step 
process. In the first step, a random number R of 
length 256 bits is generated such that R = {0, 
1}256. In the next step, R is passed through a hash 
function that could be any hash function with a 
256-bit output. In our case, we used secure hash 
algorithm 256 (SHA-256). The second step 
completely randomizes the initial user-derived 
random number R. The output of the hash function 
is termed as K and is used in symmetric key 
encryption [e.g., the Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES)] for securing the data. 
CS Key Share Ki: For each of the users in the 
group, the CS generates Ki, such that Ki = {0, 1} 
^256. Ki serves as the CS portion of the key and is 
used to compute K whenever an 
encryption/decryption request is received by the 
CS. Moreover, it is ensured by comparison that the 
distinct Ki is generated for every file user. 
User Key Share Ki’: Ki’ is computed for each of 
the users in the group as follows: 
Ki’ = K XOR Ki. Ki’ serves as the user portion of 
the key and is used to compute K when needed. 
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